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Physically unclonable function (PUF) circuit's implementations for cryptographic applications were 
studied extensively at the past decade. Among the numerous implementations proposed as PUF 
primitives, volatile SRAM based cells are considered as promising candidate for identification due to 
their simplicity and common conversion from standard libraries. The inherent metastable nature of 
the cross-coupled symmetric inverters is used as random bit generation where local process 
mismatches might bias each cell, into a unique stable state. The amount of mismatch eventually 
determines the stability of the cell in transitioning to a unique biased state during repetitive readings.  
There are several matrices which define the performance of any PUF implementation, reliability or 
stability is considered as one of the two key parameters, and for certain applications the most 
important parameter. 
The common methodology to handle unreliable cells is by storing helper data and implementing error 
correction codes during the enrolment phase of the PUF [1][2]. Another approach (e.g. [3]–[5] ) 
involve the detection and exclusion of unreliable cells. All together implementing these methods, 
could potentially lead to near 100% reliable array. However this implementation is achieved with the 
cost of custom cell design and considerable logic overhead. Thus assessment and management of 
cells reliability is having practical implications for SRAM PUF or TRNG implantations. Cross-coupled 
cells wake up value and evaluation of stability/uniqueness of this value were studied by [6], [7] based 
on measurements made on FPGAs and IC implementations of cells. An attempt to develop a model 
that describe the bitcell wakeup value was made by [8] using SNR analysis model. 
In our study we propose a new model that relates between the mismatch parameters of the SRAM 
transistors to the probability of the cell to have a definite bias. The cell power-up process is modeled 
by simulations which include the various environmental and noise contributions to the cell settling 
into a consistent stable state. When standard SRAM array is powered up at realistic bias ramp rates, 
the dominant mechanism that determines the cross-coupled inverter latching is sub-threshold 
leakage. During the cell power-up electric charge start to leak through the two upper pMOS (see 
figure 1) , after some charge buildup at Q and Qb nodes this charge will also drain through the two 
bottom nMOS devices.  Mismatch between the left and right sides of the circuit will eventually lead to 
latching when voltage difference between Q and Qb will become critical. In our model we correlate 
the threshold voltage mismatch and noise density to the probability for latching event of the cell. 
Assuming only sub-threshold leakage mechanism is relevant at the early stage before latching the KCL 
equation for the current flow (see figure 1) at the relevant junctions will be, assuming a quasi-
stationary approximation:                            These equalities are perturbed by 
transistors shot noise which is the dominant noise mechanism for diffusion currents at the weak 
inversion regime. For very short integration times a saddle imbalance between the left equation and 
the right equation will yield deviation in charge buildup between the left and the right nodes of the 
coupled device which eventually induce latching. In order to validate the model we performed SPICE 
simulations with various threshold voltage mismatches between the coupled transistors in the cross-
coupled inverter. The simulations were made in the presence of noise. The cumulative probability 
distribution of the repeated simulations was plotted Vs. various combinations of threshold voltage 
mismatches. The results are plotted in Figure 2 for several     combinations. The simulations show 
that the impact of pMOS mismatch is clearly the dominating parameter which determines the cell 
value. Nonetheless nMOS mismatch might compensate or enhance for the pMOS mismatch effect as 
shown in this figure. The combined effect of pMOS and nMOS mismatch will be weighted under the 
circuit current flow considerations and the model will consider the non-correlated probabilities of the 
3 transistors that determine the two nodes mismatch. Another observation that will be demonstrated 
in this work is the impact of ramp-rate on the cell stability. This effect is shown in figure 3 where we 
can clearly observe the counter intuitive effect of ramp-rate over the cell stability. These phenomena 
will be explained in the light of our model. 
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Figure 1 – SRAM cell 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – CDF ΔVs. Vtn mismatch for different ΔVtp; (triangles) ΔVtp=0, (+) 
ΔVtp=1.5mV,  (x) ΔVtp=3mV. We can observe the large shift of the CDF median (6 
mV) when adding small  ΔVtp 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – CDF Vs. ΔVtp mismatch for different voltage ramp rates from 0 to 1.2V; 
(+) 0.1 usec, (triangles) 0.5 usec, and (x) 10 usec. The solid lines are normal 
distribution CDF fit with σ=0.75,  2.2 and 3.2 mV respectively 
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